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JORDAN, Circuit Judge  
 
 If it were somehow in doubt before, we take the 
opportunity now to hold that bank robbery by intimidation is 
categorically a “crime of violence” under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.  In doing so, we join several other 
federal courts of appeals that have held the same under the 




Jerome Wilson pled guilty to unarmed bank robbery in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  The District Court imposed 
a prison sentence that was in part a result of the guidelines’ 
career-offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which, in 
Wilson’s case, was applicable if bank robbery by intimidation 
counts as a crime of violence.  The District Court correctly 
applied that enhancement, and it was not plain error that the 
Court also applied an enhancement for making a death threat.  




 The facts of the case are not in dispute.  Wilson pled 
guilty to three counts of unarmed bank robbery or attempted 
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and the 
District Court sentenced him to 151 months’ imprisonment, 
three years of supervised released, restitution of $3,122, and a 
special assessment of $300.  The sentence was based in part 
on two enhancements: one for being a career offender, 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, and the other for making a death threat, 
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).  Of the three crimes, two were 
completed bank robberies by demand note and one was an 
attempted robbery by demand note.  In one of the completed 
robberies, the note Wilson passed to the bank teller said, “this 
is a hold up, empty your drawers now, or else.”  (App. at 37.) 
 
The presentence report (“PSR”) suggested that 
§ 2113(a) be treated as a “crime of violence” under the 
guidelines, and, because Wilson had two prior convictions 
under that same statute, that he be classified as a “career 
offender.”  If followed, those suggestions increased Wilson’s 
total offense level from 27 to 32 and his criminal history 
category from IV to VI.  The PSR credited Wilson with a 3-
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level downward adjustment of his offense level for 
acceptance of responsibility, making his total suggested 
offense level 29.  Ultimately, the threat-of-death enhancement 
did not increase the total offense level beyond that which was 
mandated by the career-offender enhancement; that is, even 
without the threat-of-death enhancement, Wilson’s total 
offense level and criminal history category would have been 
the same. 
 
At sentencing, Wilson did not raise any objections 
concerning the 2-level threat-of-death enhancement, but he 
did object to being treated as a “career offender” under the 
guidelines, arguing that § 2113(a) did not meet the 
guidelines’ definition of a “crime of violence.”  The District 
Court overruled that objection and ultimately sentenced him 
to the bottom of the guidelines range calculated in the PSR.   
 
 
  II.  Discussion1 
 
On appeal, Wilson challenges the District Court’s 
application of the career-offender enhancement and the 
threat-of-death enhancement to his sentence.  We conclude 
that the District Court correctly applied the career-offender 
enhancement because bank robbery by intimidation is 
categorically a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a) of the 
guidelines.  We further conclude that the District Court’s 
application of the threat-of-death enhancement was not plain 
error. 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 




A. Bank Robberyby Intimidation is 
Categorically a Crime of Violence Under the 
Guidelines. 
 
 Whether bank robbery by intimidation is a crime of 
violence is a strange but not new question.  It is strange 
because to ask the question would seem to answer it – of 
course the threat of violence is inherent in bank robbery, and 
§ 4B1.2(a)(1) of the guidelines specifically includes within 
the definition of a “crime of violence” “any offense under 
federal or state law ... that ... has as an element the ... 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another 
... .”  It is not a new question, though, because seven of our 
sister circuits have had to address this question and have 
concluded that bank robbery by intimidation does indeed 
qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)(1) or the 
nearly identically worded “elements” clause of the ACCA, 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).2  See United States v. Hopkins, 577 
                                              
2 Like § 4B1.2(a), the ACCA is divided into an 
“elements” clause, which defines “crime of violence” broadly 
to include federal or state law offenses that involve the use or 
threatened use of force, and an “enumerated offenses” clause, 
which lists certain specific offenses that are to be considered 
crimes of violence.  Robbery is among the enumerated 
offenses, but we have chosen to address the crime at issue 
here – 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) – under the elements clause of 
§ 4B1.2(a).  Many courts of appeals have concluded that bank 
robbery under § 2113(a) is categorically a crime of violence.  
See United States v. Harper, 869 F.3d 624, 626-27 (8th Cir. 
2017) (holding “bank robbery by intimidation under 
§ 2113(a) is a crime of violence under ... [the guidelines], 
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F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[Because] the definition of a 
‘violent felony’ under the ACCA is sufficiently similar to the 
definition of a ‘crime of violence’ under the Sentencing 
Guidelines[,] ... authority interpreting one is generally applied 
to the other[.]” (footnote omitted)).  Wilson argues that, 
because a defendant can be convicted of violating § 2113(a) 
without specifically intending to intimidate anyone, bank 
robbery cannot categorically be called a crime of violence.  
For the reasons that follow, that argument fails. 
 
1. The Categorical Approach Applies to 
Determine Whether Bank Robbery by 
Intimidation is a “Crime of Violence” 
Under the Guidelines. 
 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
decision that a conviction is one for a crime of violence, as 
defined by the guidelines, United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 
                                                                                                     
because it involves a threatened use of force”); United States 
v. Ellison, 866 F.3d 32, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2017) (same); United 
States v. Campbell, 865 F.3d 853, 854 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); 
United States v. Brewer, 848 F.3d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(same); In re Sams, 830 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(holding “bank robbery conviction under § 2113(a) by force 
and violence or by intimidation qualifies as a crime of 
violence under the [ACCA] use-of-force clause”); United 
States v. McBride, 826 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding “[a] taking by intimidation under § 2113(a) ... 
involves the threat to use physical force” under the 
guidelines); United States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, 157 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (holding “bank robbery under ... § 2113(a) is a 
‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of ... [the ACCA]”). 
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185, 188 (3d Cir. 2014), and we use the categorical approach 
to determine whether a conviction so qualifies, United States 
v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 2017).  That 
approach requires us to compare the elements of the statute 
under which the defendant was convicted to the guidelines’ 
definition of “crime of violence.”  Id. at 133-34.  A 
conviction under § 2113(a) can be a crime of violence only if 
“‘the least of th[e] acts’ criminalized” is sufficient to meet the 
guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence.  Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 (2013) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010)); 
see also United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 350 (3d Cir. 
2016) (determining “the least culpable conduct hypothetically 
necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute” (citation 
omitted)). 
 
Here, Wilson was convicted under the first paragraph 
of § 2113(a),3 which states: 
                                              
3 The District Court determined that § 2113(a) was a 
divisible statute because it contained two paragraphs, each 
containing a separate version of the crime.  See Descamps v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013) (explaining that a 
statute is “divisible” when it “comprises multiple, alternative 
versions of the crime”).  Having determined that § 2113(a) 
was divisible, the District Court applied the modified 
categorical approach to determine that Wilson was convicted 
under § 2113(a)’s first paragraph.  See id. at 2283-84 
(instructing courts to apply the “modified categorical 
approach” to divisible statutes).  The parties do not dispute 
those rulings.  Accordingly, we proceed straight to the 
categorical approach, which applies once a court has focused 




Whoever, by force and violence, or by 
intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the 
person or presence of another, or obtains or 
attempts to obtain by extortion any property or 
money or any other thing of value belonging to, 
or in the care, custody, control, management, or 
possession of, any bank, credit union, or any 
savings and loan association ... Shall be fined ... 
or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or 
both.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  The least culpable conduct covered by 
that statute is unarmed bank robbery by intimidation.  See 
United States v. Brewer, 848 F.3d 711, 715 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(concluding that the least culpable conduct under § 2113(a) is 
“robbery by intimidation”).  Thus, we must compare the 
elements of bank robbery by intimidation to the guidelines’ 
definition of “crime of violence.”  Chapman, 866 F.3d at 133-
34. 
 
As noted earlier, supra n.2, guidelines § 4B1.2 defines 
“crime of violence” for purposes of the career-offender 
enhancement as: 
 
(a) ... any offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, that—  
 
                                                                                                     
F.3d at 188-90.  All references to “§ 2113(a)” throughout this 
opinion refer only to the first paragraph of § 2113(a). 
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(1) has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another, or 
 
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, 
kidnapping, aggravated assault, a 
forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, 
extortion, or the use or unlawful 
possession of a firearm described in 26 
U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c). 
 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).  We refer to § 4B1.2(a)(1) as the 
“elements,” or “force,” clause and to § 4B1.2(a)(2) as the 
“enumerated offenses” clause.  To determine whether 
Wilson’s conviction categorically qualifies as a “crime of 
violence” under the “elements” clause, we ask whether bank 
robbery by intimidation has as an element of the offense “the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person of another[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). 
 
2. Section 2113(a) Has as an Element of 
the Offense “The Use, Attempted Use, 
or Threatened Use of Physical Force.” 
 
Unarmed bank robbery by intimidation clearly does 
involve the “threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).  If a common 
sense understanding of the word “intimidation” were not 
enough to prove that,4 our precedent establishes that 
                                              
4 The word “intimidate” is defined in the dictionary as 
“to make ... fearful” or “to compel or deter by or as if by 
10 
 
§ 2113(a)’s prohibition on taking the “property or money or 
any other thing of value” either “by force and violence, or by 
intimidation” has as an element the “threat of force.”  United 
States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 541 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted), vacated on other 
grounds, 159 F.3d 774 (3d Cir. 1998); see also id. (“As used 
in § 2113(a), the term ‘intimidation’ means ‘to make fearful 
or put into fear.’” (citation omitted)).  Whether the theft of 
money from a bank involved intimidation is determined under 
an objective standard and from the victim’s perspective, “i.e., 
whether an ordinary person in the [bank] teller’s position 
reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm from the 
defendant’s acts.”  Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
Each of our sister circuits to have addressed the issue 
has, not surprisingly, concluded that robbing a bank by 
intimidation does involve the “the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).  Those courts also define 
§ 2113(a)’s “intimidation” requirement in terms of a “threat 
of physical force,” when interpreting the “elements” clause in 
the guidelines or the similarly worded “elements” clause of 
the ACCA.5  Our conclusion is the same.6 
                                                                                                     
threats,” Intimidate, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intimidate (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2017). 
5 See, e.g., Harper, 869 F.3d at 626 (“Intimidation 
means the threat of force.”); Ellison, 866 F.3d at 37 
(“[P]roving ‘intimidation’ under § 2113(a) requires proving 
that a threat of bodily harm was made.”); Campbell, 865 F.3d 
at 856  (“[I]ntimidation in § 2113(a) means the threat of 
force.”); Brewer, 848 F.3d at 715 (“The kind of ‘intimidation’ 
11 
 
                                                                                                     
that suffices to put a victim in fear of bodily injury during the 
course of a bank robbery, and which would in turn allow a 
defendant to complete such a robbery, is the very sort of 
threat of immediate, destructive, and violent force required to 
satisfy the ‘crime of violence’ definition.”); In re Sams, 830 
F.3d at 1239 (quoting and adopting reasoning from United 
States v. McNeal, 818 F.3d 141, that “[b]ank robbery under 
§ 2113(a), ‘by intimidation,’ requires the threatened use of 
physical force”); McBride, 826 F.3d at 296 (defining 
intimidation as “conduct and words ... calculated to create the 
impression that any resistance or defiance ... would be met by 
force”); McNeal, 818 F.3d at 153 (“Bank robbery under 
§ 2113(a), ‘by intimidation,’ requires the threatened use of 
physical force.”). 
 
6 In his opening brief, Wilson argues that § 2113(a) 
encompasses conduct that does not meet the Supreme Court’s 
definition of “physical force,” i.e., “violent force—that is, 
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another 
person[,]” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140, because one can be 
convicted under § 2113(a) for threatening to expose another 
to a hazardous substance.  At oral argument, however, Wilson 
conceded that that position is untenable in light of our recent 
opinion in United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, which 
was published after Wilson filed his opening brief.  Because 
Chapman forecloses that argument, we do not further address 
it here.  See id. at 133 (“[T]he ‘use’ of ‘physical force,’ as 
used in § 4B1.2(a)(1), involves the intentional employment of 
something capable of causing physical pain or injury to 
another person, regardless of whether the perpetrator struck 
the victim’s body.”). 
12 
 
3. Section 2113(a) Requires Knowing 
 Conduct. 
 
Wilson argues that § 2113(a) is not categorically a 
crime of violence because one can be convicted under that 
statute without intending to intimidate anyone.  More 
particularly, his argument proceeds as follows.  First, he says 
correctly that the “intimidation” element of § 2113(a) is 
measured by an objective standard from the victim’s 
perspective, “i.e., whether an ordinary person in the [bank] 
teller’s position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm 
from the defendant’s acts.” Askari, 140 F.3d at 541 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Next, he contends that applying 
that standard criminalizes negligent behavior because a 
defendant may act in a way that causes an ordinary teller to 
reasonably infer a threat of harm, even though the defendant 
has no intent to cause such concern.7   He says, “A defendant 
may be convicted, for example, even if he acts on the sincere 
belief that a teller will comply with a demand for money 
                                              
7 The proposition that a defendant can be convicted 
under § 2113(a) without intending to intimidate is not without 
support in the case law.  See United States v. Kelley, 412 F.3d 
1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a conviction 
pursuant to § 2113(a) does not require the defendant “intend 
for an act to be intimidating”); United States v. Yockel, 320 
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding the intimidation 
element of § 2113(a) satisfied “if an ordinary person in [the 
teller’s] position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily 
harm ... whether or not [the defendant] actually intended the 
intimidation” (first alteration and emphasis in original) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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purely in reliance on bank policy, rather than out of fear.”  
(Opening Br. at 12.) 
 
To bolster his argument, he turns to Elonis v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  In that case, the Supreme 
Court reversed a defendant’s conviction for transmitting 
through interstate commerce threats to injure another person, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  135 S. Ct. at 2012.  That 
statute contained no mens rea requirement.  See id. at 2008 
(“An individual who ‘transmits in interstate or foreign 
commerce any communication containing any threat ... to 
injure the person of another’ is guilty of a felony[.]” (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c))).  The defendant appealed and argued 
that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury 
that, to be guilty, he had to have “intended” his 
communication to be a threat.  Id. at 2007.  The district court 
had instead instructed the jury to convict if it found that the 
defendant “intentionally ma[de] a statement in a context or 
under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by” the 
intended recipient as a serious threat.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
highlighted the “reasonable person” language in the jury 
instruction and concluded that using it had permitted a 
“negligence standard” to be imported into that criminal 
statute.  Id. at 2011.   
 
Wilson’s attempt to extend Elonis’s reasoning to 
§ 2113(a) is misguided.  That case clarifies that courts should 
read a scienter requirement into statutes only to the extent 
necessary to prevent criminalizing otherwise innocent 
conduct.  Id.  The Supreme Court determined that § 875(c) 
required the government to prove a defendant intended his 
communication to be threatening because the only thing 
14 
 
separating innocent conduct from wrongful conduct under 
that statute was “the threatening nature of the 
communication.”  Id.  In other words, the Court emphasized 
that “a defendant generally must know the facts that make his 
conduct fit the definition of the offense[.]”  Id. at 2009 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  Convicting a 
defendant solely on how a reasonable person perceived the 
relevant communication impermissibly risked creating 
criminal culpability for nothing more than a foolishly worded 
message.  Id. at 2011.  But, the Elonis Court’s reasoning is 
inapposite here because, as recognized in Elonis itself, a 
statute criminalizing acts knowingly undertaken to deprive 
someone of property has, by virtue of that “knowing” 
element, a sufficient mens rea to avoid the risk of making 
lawful conduct unlawful.  Id. at 2010 (citing Carter v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).  
 
In Carter v. United States, the Supreme Court 
specifically held that “the presumption in favor of scienter 
demands only that we read subsection (a) [of § 2113] as 
requiring proof of general intent—that is, that the defendant 
possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the 
crime (here, the taking of property of another by force and 
violence or intimidation).”  530 U.S. at 268.  There was no 
reason to read a specific intent requirement into § 2113(a) 
because reading a general intent requirement into the statute 
was sufficient to “separate wrongful from otherwise innocent 
conduct.”  Id. at 269.  Carter thus stands for the proposition 
that, because § 2113(a) is a statute requiring only general 
intent, it is enough for the government to prove that the 




Other courts of appeals have rejected the argument that 
§ 2113(a) criminalizes negligent or reckless behavior.  They 
have harmonized Carter with the “reasonable teller” standard 
inherent in § 2113(a)’s intimidation requirement by requiring 
the government to prove a defendant “knew that his actions 
were objectively intimidating.”  McNeal, 818 F.3d at 155.8  In 
short, Carter and Elonis are not at odds.  By reading a general 
intent requirement into § 2113(a), Carter requires the 
government to prove that the defendant acted with the 
knowledge that those actions would result in the taking of 
property by the use of force and violence or by intimidation.  
Carter, 530 U.S. at 268.  Using an objective standard to apply 
§ 2113(a)’s intimidation requirement does not trigger the 
concerns raised by Elonis, because, to be guilty, the defendant 
must have knowingly robbed or attempted to rob a bank – in 
other words, the defendant had to know he was taking money 
from a financial institution that was not simply giving it 
away.  This fact exposes the nonsense in Wilson’s claim that 
a teller might “comply with a [robber’s] demand for money 
                                              
8 See also Harper, 869 F.3d at 626 (rejecting 
contention that Elonis created a new global definition of 
“threat” requiring the government prove the same mens rea in 
criminal statutes other than § 875(c)); Ellison, 866 F.3d at 39 
(adopting the McNeal standard); Campbell, 865 F.3d at 856 
(“Intimidation as an element of a bank robbery does not occur 
by negligent or accidental conduct.  It is caused by an 
intentional threat of force.”); McBride, 826 F.3d at 296 (“The 
defendant must at least know that his actions would create the 
impression in an ordinary person that resistance would be met 
by force.  A taking by intimidation under § 2113(a) therefore 




purely in reliance on bank policy[.]”  (Opening Br. at 12.)  By 
definition, § 2113(a) requires proof that a defendant 
knowingly engaged in an act that would cause an ordinary 
bank teller to be intimidated and turn over money that the 
defendant knew he had no right to have.9  Because a 
conviction under § 2113(a) requires the government to prove 
a defendant knowingly committed a bank robbery by force 
and violence or intimidation, it is quite obviously a crime of 
violence under guidelines § 4B1.2(a)(1). 
 
                                              
9 Wilson maintains that every circuit court has misread 
Carter.  As explained above, we do not agree with Wilson on 
that point.  Nevertheless, we briefly note three hypotheticals 
that Wilson poses for his contention that § 2113(a) can be 
violated by negligent or reckless behavior: (1) a defendant 
could rob a bank with no intent to intimidate based on a 
sincere belief that the bank teller would simply hand over 
money on demand based on a bank’s policy to comply with 
all demands for money, regardless of the perceived 
seriousness of the threat; (2) a drug addict might submit a 
demand note to a teller without caring whether or not his note 
resulted in a teller handing over money; and (3) a bank robber 
with a physically imposing presence could instill fear in a 
bank teller without intending to intimidate.  In each of those 
examples, an individual is taking intentional action, i.e., 
attempting to rob a bank.  Imposing an objective standard 
with relation to the intimidation element does not change that 
and does not turn § 2113(a) into a statute that criminalizes 
negligent behavior.  Accordingly, the least culpable way of 
violating § 2113(a)’s first paragraph will always constitute a 




We thus join our sister circuits in holding that bank 
robbery by intimidation, as set forth in § 2113(a), 
categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under 
§ 4B1.2(a)’s “elements” clause.10  Since bank robbery by 
intimidation is indeed a crime of violence, the District Court 
was correct to apply the career-offender enhancement. 
 
                                              
10 Because we conclude that bank robbery by 
intimidation is categorically a “crime of violence” under the 
“elements” clause, we do not analyze whether it also is a 
“crime of violence” under the “enumerated offenses” clause.  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). 
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B. Applying the Threat-of-Death Enhancement 
Was Not Plain Error. 
 
Wilson has also complained on appeal that the District 
Court wrongly subjected him to a sentencing enhancement for 
making a death threat.  He did not, however, register that 
objection before the District Court.  “We review an 
unpreserved objection for plain error.”  Dahl, 833 F.3d at 
349.  A plain error has occurred when there is “(1) [an] error, 
(2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s 
substantial rights.”  United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 
539 (3d Cir. 2008).  “If all three conditions are met, [we] may 
then exercise [our] discretion to notice a forfeited error, but 
only if ... the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  In the context of sentencing, a defendant 
establishes that an error affected his substantial rights by 
showing that the sentence imposed “was affected, in the sense 
that it likely would have been different but for the error.”  
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
Here, Wilson cannot establish that the District Court 
committed plain error by applying the threat-of-death 
enhancement because that enhancement did not affect his 
sentence.  Assuming that Wilson could establish that 
application of the enhancement constituted an obvious error, 
he still cannot show that the error affected his substantial 
rights because the District Court correctly applied the career-
offender enhancement, and the threat-of-death enhancement 
did not increase his sentence beyond the sentence mandated 
19 
 
by the career-offender enhancement.11  Thus, Wilson has not 
shown plain error. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence 
imposed by the District Court. 
                                              
11 Once the career-offender enhancement is triggered, 
the offense level determined by that guideline applies if it “is 
greater than the offense level otherwise applicable[.]”  
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b).  The offense level mandated by the 
career-offender enhancement of § 4B1.1(b)(3) is 32, which is 
greater than 27, the “offense level otherwise applicable” with 
the threat-of-death enhancement.  Accordingly, the threat-of-
death enhancement would only increase Wilson’s sentence if 
we were to hold the career-offender enhancement 
inapplicable.  Because we hold that the career-offender 
enhancement applies, any error (if there were any) in 
applying the threat-of-death enhancement did not affect the 
sentence Wilson received. 
